Search Results For: Rohinton Fali Nariman J.


VLS Finance Ltd vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 28, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 158BC: A stay on the conduct of a "special audit" u/s 142(2A) amounts to a "stay of the assessment proceedings" and extends limitation u/s 158BE. One warrant of authorisation can be used for multiple visits and searches and limitation commences only after the panchnama records the conclusion of the search

As a general rule, therefore, when there is no stay of the assessment proceedings passed by the Court, Explanation 1 to Section 158BE of the Act may not be attracted. However, this general statement of legal principle has to be read subject to an exception in order to interpret it rationally and practically. In those cases where stay of some other nature is granted than the stay of the assessment proceedings but the effect of such stay is to prevent the assessing officer from effectively passing assessment order, even that kind of stay order may be treated as stay of the assessment proceedings because of the reason that such stay order becomes an obstacle for the assessing officer to pass an assessment order thereby preventing the assessing officer to proceed with the assessment proceedings and carry out appropriate assessment

CIT vs. Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: May 2, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1981-82
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S. 153: In a case of conferment of “concurrent” jurisdiction upon the ITO & IAC, the ITO does not stand denuded of powers to make an assessment. It is open to the ITO to assume jurisdiction and pass the assessment order in case the IAC does not exercise those powers. What is important is the actual exercise of powers and not merely conferment of the powers. S. 144B applies only if the IAC exercises powers or performs the functions of an ITO

It is not the IAC who exercises the powers or performs the functions of the ITO, even when such a power was conferred upon him, concurrently with the ITO. The significant feature of Section 125A of the Act is that even when the IAC is given the same powers and functions which are to be performed by the ITO in relation to any area or classes or person or income or classes of income or cases or classes of cases, on the conferment of such powers, the ITO does not stand denuded of those powers. With conferment of such powers on the IAC gives him “concurrent” jurisdiction which means that both, ITO as well as the IAC, are empowered to exercise those functions including passing assessment order. It is still open to the ITO to assume the jurisdiction and pass the order in case the IAC does not exercise those powers in respect of the assessment year. Provisions of Section 144B would not apply only if the IAC exercises powers or performs the functions of an ITO. What is important is the actual exercise of powers and not merely conferment of the powers that are borne out from the bare reading of sub-Section (4) of Section 125B

ITC Limited vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 26, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 27, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 15, 17, 192: Concept of "salary" explained. Held that as "tips" are paid to employees of the assessee from an outsider on a voluntary basis and the employees have no vested right to receive the same, the same is not "salary" and the assessee has no obligation to deduct TDS

It can be seen, on an analysis of Section 15, that for the said Section to apply, there should be a vested right in an employee to claim any salary from an employer or former employer, whether due or not if paid; or paid or allowed, though not due. In CIT v. L.W. Russel reported in 53 ITR 91 (SC), this Court dealt with the provisions of Section 7(1) of the 1922 Act, which preceded Sections 15 and 17 of the present Act and held that it is necessary for the employee to have a vested right to receive an amount from his employer before he could be brought to tax under the head “salaries”; Tips being purely voluntary amounts that may or may not be paid by customers for services rendered to them would not, therefore, fall within Section 15(b) at all. Also, it is clear that salary must be paid or allowed to an employee in the previous year “by or on behalf of” an employer. Even assuming that the expression “allowed” is an expression of width, the salary must be paid by or on behalf of an employer. It must first be noticed that the expression “employer” is different from the expression “person”. An “employer” is a person who employs another person under a contract of employment, express or implied, to perform work for the employer. Therefore, Section 15(b) necessarily has reference to the contract of employment between employer and employee, and salary paid or allowed must therefore have reference to such contract of employment.

Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh (Supreme Court)

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DATE: March 2, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 18, 2016 (Date of publication)
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Important law on concept of "ancestral property" under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the formation of a HUF by the surviving members of the deceased explained

On a conjoint reading of Sections 4, 8 and 19 of the Act, after joint family property has been distributed in accordance with section 8 on principles of intestacy, the joint family property ceases to be joint family property in the hands of the various persons who have succeeded to it as they hold the property as tenants in common and not as joint tenants

CIT vs. Meghalaya Steels Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: March 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 12, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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S. 80-IB(4): Subsidies (such as transport subsidy, Interest subsidy and power subsidy) paid to the assessee with the object of reducing the cost of production constitutes "profits derived from the business of the industrial undertaking" and is eligible for deduction u/s 80-IB. Liberty India 317 ITR 218 (SC) is distinguishable on facts

In Liberty India v. Commissioner of Income Tax 317 ITR 218 (SC)/ 2009 (9) SCC 328, what this Court was concerned with was an export incentive, which is very far removed from reimbursement of an element of cost. A DEPB drawback scheme is not related to the business of an industrial undertaking for manufacturing or selling its products. DEPB entitlement arises only when the undertaking goes on to export the said product, that is after it manufactures or produces the same. Pithily put, if there is no export, there is no DEPB entitlement, and therefore its relation to manufacture of a product and/or sale within India is not proximate or direct but is one step removed. Also, the object behind DEPB entitlement, as has been held by this Court, is to neutralize the incidence of customs duty payment on the import content of the export product which is provided for by credit to customs duty against the export product. In such a scenario, it cannot be said that such duty exemption scheme is derived from profits and gains made by the industrial undertaking or business itself

Jagraon Exports vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: February 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 1, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 80HHC: Sale proceeds of scrap cannot be included in total turnover

The issue in these appeals pertains to the question whether the proceeds generated from the sale of scrap would be included in the total turnover. In the recent decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Punjab Stainless Steel Industries & Ors. reported in [2014] 364 ITR 144 (SC) it has been held that sale proceeds generated from the sale of scrap would not be included in the total turnover for the purpose of deduction under Section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961

CIT vs. Society For The Promotion Of Education, Adventure Sport & Conservation Of Environment (Supreme Court)

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DATE: February 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 12AA: Non disposal of an application for registration before the expiry of six months as provided u/s 12AA (2) results in deemed grant of registration

The short issue is with regard to the deemed registration of an application under Section 12AA of the Income Tax Act. The High Court has taken the view that once an application is made under the said provision and in case the same is not responded to within six months, it would be taken that the application is registered under the provision

CIT vs. Bank Of Nova Scotia (Supreme Court)

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DATE: January 7, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 271C: Penalty for failure to deduct TDS cannot be levied if Dept is unable to show contumacious conduct on the part of the assessee

We have carefully considered the rival submissions. In the instant case we are not dealing with collection of tax u/s 201(1) or compensatory interest u/s 201(1A). The case of the assessee is that these amounts have already been paid so as to end dispute with Revenue. In the present appeals we are concerned with levy of penalty u/s 271-C for which it is necessary to establish that there was contumacious conduct on the part of the assessee. We find that on similar facts Hon’ble Delhi High Court have deleted levy of penalty u/s 271-C in the cae of M/s. Itochu Corporation, reported in 268 ITR 172 (Del) and in the case of CIT Vs. Mitsui & Company Ltd. Reported in 272 ITR 545

Hero Cycles (P) Ltd vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: November 5, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 26, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1988-89
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S. 36(1)(iii): Law on when interest expenditure on loans diverted to sister concerns and directors can be allowed as business expenditure explained

Once it is established that there is nexus between the expenditure and the purpose of business (which need not necessarily be the business of the assessee itself), the Revenue cannot justifiably claim to put itself in the arm-chair of the businessman or in the position of the Board of Directors and assume the role to decide how much is reasonable expenditure having regard to the circumstances of the case. It further held that no businessman can be compelled to maximize his profit and that the income tax authorities must put themselves in the shoes of the assessee and see how a prudent businessman would act. The authorities must not look at the matter from their own view point but that of a prudent businessman

DCIT vs. Zuari Estate Development & Investment Co Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 17, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 26, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1991-92
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S. 143(1)/ 147: As a s. 143(1) intimation is not an assessment, there is no question of "change of opinion" by the AO

Can it be said that any “assessment” is done by them? The reply is an emphatic “no”. The intimation under Section 143(1)(a) was deemed to be a notice of demand under Section 156, for the apparent purpose of making machinery provisions relating to recovery of tax applicable. By such application only recovery indicated to be payable in the intimation became permissible. And nothing more can be inferred from the deeming provision. Therefore, there being no assessment under Section 143(1)(a), the question of change of opinion, as contended, does not arise

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