Search Results For: Mayank Nagi


COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , , , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: March 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 194H TDS: Payment gateway charges paid to a bank for swiping credit cards are in the nature of fees for banking services and not "commission" or "brokerage". Accordingly, no TDS is deductible from the said charges u/s 194H and no disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) can be made (JDS Apparels 370 ITR 454 (Del) followed)

The bank in question is not concerned with buying or selling of goods or even with the reason and cause as to why the card was swiped. It is not bothered or concerned with the quality, price, nature, quantum etc. of the goods bought/sold. The bank merely provides banking services in the form of payment and subsequently collects the payment. The amount punched in the swiping machine is credited to the account of the retailer by the acquiring bank, i.e. HDFC in this case, after retaining a small portion of the same as their charges. The banking services cannot be covered and treated as services rendered by an agent for the principal during the course of buying or selling of goods as the banker does not render any service in the nature of agency.

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: January 22, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 220(6) Stay of demand: The AO cannot impose the per se condition that pending consideration of the application for stay of demand, certain minimum amount (15%/ 20%) has to be deposited by the assessee as prescribed by the CBDT. He has apply his mind and decide the application for stay of demand

It is evident that the concerned authorities and tax officials have to apply their mind to decide an application for stay of demand. This does not, however, mean that any particular AO in a given case has to impose a per se condition that pending consideration of the application for stay of demand, certain minimum amount has to be deposited

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , , ,
COUNSEL: , ,
DATE: September 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 3, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Transfer Pricing: Steps to be undertaken in identification of comparable transactions/entities while fixing the ALP and the margin explained. Though the TNMM method allows broad flexibility tolerance in the selection of comparables, broad functionality is not sufficient to find the comparable entity. There must be similarity with the controlled transaction

In so far as identifying comparable transactions/entities is concerned, the same would not differ irrespective of the transfer pricing method adopted. In other words, the comparable transactions/entities must be selected on the basis of similarity with the controlled transaction entity. Comparability of controlled and uncontrolled transactions has to be judged, inter alia, with reference to comparability factors as indicated under rule 10B(2) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962. Comparability analysis by the transactional net margin method may be less sensitive to certain dissimilarities between the tested party and the comparables. However, that cannot be the consideration for diluting the standards of selecting comparable transactions/entities. A higher product and functional similarity would strengthen the efficacy of the method in ascertaining a reliable arm’s length price. Therefore, as far as possible, the comparables must be selected keeping in view the comparability factors as specified. Wide deviations in profit level indicator must trigger further investigations/analysis

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: August 30, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 2, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 115JB: As Insurance companies are required to prepare accounts as per the Insurance Act and not as per Schedule VI to the Companies Act, s. 115JB does not apply. Insurance companies are not taxed on commercial profits but on profits as computed under the Insurance Act. Accordingly, income earned on sale/redemption of investments is not chargeable to tax

The different benches of the ITAT have, in other cases, consistently held that during the period when Rule 5(b) was not operational the profit on sale of investments made by general insurance companies cannot be brought to tax. In Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax (2010) 130 TTJ (Pune) 398, the ITAT addressed the specific question of whether a logical conclusion could be drawn that an income that is not taxed in terms of Rule 5(b) could, even after such amendment was deleted, be taxed in the hands of the insurance company. It was held that income which was earlier taxable under one specific clause could not be brought to tax after the deletion of such clause

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: , ,
DATE: May 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 27, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1998-99, 1999-00, 2001-02
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 147/148 reassessment has to be based on "fresh material". A reopening based on reappraisal of existing material is invalid. The assessee's duty is only to disclose facts and not to make inferences. Consolidated Photo 281 ITR 394 (Del) is not good law

The reopening was not based on any fresh material. By revisiting the same materials the successor AO now concluded that the payments received by the Assessee pursuant to the O&M Agreements should be treated as FTS. In the circumstances, the view taken by a successor AO on the same material was indeed nothing but a mere change of opinion. It is a well-settled legal proposition, as explained in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191(SC) that once an Assessee has discharged the burden of not only producing the account books and other documents, but also the specific material relevant to the assessment, “it is for the Income-tax Officer to draw the proper inferences of fact and law therefrom and the Assessee cannot further be called upon to do so for him.” In Indian Oil Corporation v. ITO [1986] 159 ITR 956 the Court pertinently observed “it is for the taxing authority to draw inference. It is not necessary for the Assessee to draw inference.” These observations apply on all fours to the case on hand

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: , ,
DATE: May 16, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 27, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07 to 2011-12
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 132/153A: Important law explained on the preconditions necessary for the department to initiate valid search and seizure action u/s 132 and whether the assessee is entitled to challenge the same. Consequences of the search being declared void on the s. 153A assessment also explained

The law in relation to searches under Section 132 of the Act has been explained in a large number of decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. The jurisdictional facts that have to be established before a search under Section 132 (1) of the Act can be authorised are that (i) the authority issuing the authorisation is in possession of some credible information, other than surmises and conjectures (ii) that the authority has reason to believe that the conditions stipulated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 132 (1) qua the person searched exist; and (iii) the said information has nexus to such belief. The Courts have laid emphasis on the mandatory nature of the above requirement to be fulfilled under Section 132 (1) of the Act

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: August 1, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 5, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 80IA(2A): As the words "derived from" are absent, there is no requirement to prove "first degree nexus" of the receipts with the eligible business. All receipts of the undertaking are eligible for 100% deduction

The legislature having ousted applicability of sub-section (1) and (2) in the opening sentence brought in for the purposes of time line sub-section (2) into play but made no efforts whatsoever to put the assessee under sub-section (2A) to meet the stringent requirements that the profits so contemplated were to be “derived from”. The requirements of the first degree nexus of the profits from the eligible business has not been brought into play

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: , ,
DATE: February 8, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 12, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi) vs. Article 12 of DTAA: The retrospective amendment to s. 9(1)(vi) so as to supersede the law laid down in Asia Satellite 332 ITR 340 (Del) and assess transmission fees as “royalty” has no impact on assessees covered by DTAA because a corresponding amendment has not been made to the definition of “royalty” therein. Amendments to domestic law do not affect the DTAA

This Court is of the view that no amendment to the Act, whether retrospective or prospective can be read in a manner so as to extend in operation to the terms of an international treaty. In other words, a clarificatory or declaratory amendment, much less one which may seek to overcome an unwelcome judicial interpretation of law, cannot be allowed to have the same retroactive effect on an international instrument effected between two sovereign states prior to such amendment. In the context of international law, while not every attempt to subvert the obligations under the treaty is a breach, it is nevertheless a failure to give effect to the intended trajectory of the treaty. Employing interpretive amendments in domestic law as a means to imply contoured effects in the enforcement of treaties is one such attempt, which falls just short of a breach, but is nevertheless, in the opinion of this Court, indefensible