Search Results For: Vibhu Bakhru J


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DATE: August 11, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 21, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 40(b)(v): Provision in partnership deed for payment of salary at percentage share of profits multiplied by “allocable profits” is valid and entitles claim for deduction. S. 37(1): Contribution by law firm to IFA to create awareness of its activities is business expenditure

A plain reading of Clause 6(a) leads us to a conclusion that the term ‘allocable profits’ was used to mean ‘book profits’ as used in Section 40(b)(v) of the Act or otherwise the reference to the section in the Clause has no meaning. When the partners have understood and meant that the word “allocable profits” to mean surplus/book profits, prior to calculation of partners’ remuneration, and when such an understanding is manifest in its actions, we do not see any reason why the Revenue authorities should not understand this term in the same sense

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DATE: July 24, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 27, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1989-90, 1991-92
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S. 32: A licensee who is in full control of the building and can exercise the rights of the owner in his own right is entitled to depreciation

The very concept of depreciation suggests that the tax benefit on account of depreciation legitimately belongs to one who has invested in the capital asset, is utilizing the capital asset and thereby loosing gradually investment caused by wear and tear, and would need to replace the same by having lost its value fully over a period of time

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DATE: January 22, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 2(15)/ 10(23C)(iv): If the definition of "charitable purpose" is construed literally, it is violative of the principles of equality & unconstitutional. If the dominant object is not to carry on business or trade or commerce, then an incidental or ancillary activity for which a fee is charged does not destroy the character of a charitable institution

The expression “charitable purpose”, as defined in Section 2(15) cannot be construed literally and in absolute terms. It has to take colour and be considered in the context of Section 10(23C)(iv) of the said Act. It is also clear that if the literal interpretation is given to the proviso to Section 2(15) of the said Act, then the proviso would be at risk of running foul of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution India. In order to save the Constitutional validity of the proviso, the same would have to be read down and interpreted in the context of Section 10(23C)(iv) because, in our view, the context requires such an interpretation. The correct interpretation of the proviso to Section 2(15) of the said Act would be that it carves out an exception from the charitable purpose of advancement of any other object of general public utility and that exception is limited to activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business for a cess or fee or any other consideration. In both the activities, in the nature of trade, commerce or business or the activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, the dominant and the prime objective has to be seen. If the dominant and prime objective of the institution, which claims to have been established for charitable purposes, is profit making, whether its activities are directly in the nature of trade, commerce or business or indirectly in the rendering of any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, then it would not be entitled to claim its object to be a ‘charitable purpose’. On the flip side, where an institution is not driven primarily by a desire or motive to earn profits, but to do charity through the advancement of an object of general public utility, it cannot but be regarded as an institution established for charitable purposes

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DATE: December 5, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 8, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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A statutory order, even if a nullity, continues to be effective unless set aside by a competent authority. Such orders cannot be nullified by an administrative order

The principal controversy to be addressed is whether the Chairman of the Income Tax Settlement Commission could, as administrative head of the Income Tax Settlement Commission, declare the order passed by the CPIO and Joint Commissioner of Income Tax directing …

R. K. Jain vs. Chairman, Settlement Commission (Delhi High Court) Read More »

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DATE: November 24, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 2, 2014 (Date of publication)
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RTI Act: Income-tax returns are confidential and cannot be disclosed except where disclosure is in public interest and outweighs possible harm to the assessee

(i) Undoubtedly, the income tax returns and information provided to Income Tax Authorities by assessees is confidential and not required to be placed in public domain. Given the nature of the income tax returns and the information necessary to support …

Naresh Trehan vs. Rakesh Kumar Gupta (Delhi High Court) Read More »

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DATE: November 11, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 12, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Liability for TDS u/s 194A does not arise if the beneficiary is not ascertainable and the person in whose name the interest is credited is not person liable to pay tax. Circular No. 08/ 2011 dated 14.10.2011 set aside

(i) Essentially, the controversy in the present case involves the question whether the provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act would be applicable in respect of interest which is payable on the fixed deposits maintained by this Court with the …

UCO Bank vs. UOI (Delhi High Court) Read More »

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DATE: July 8, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 7, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04 to 2008-09
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S. 143(3) assessment on amalgamating company is a nullity. U/s 170(2) assessment has to be on successor. Mistake cannot be cured u/s 292B. Participation by amalgamating company is irrelevant as there is no estoppel against a statute

(i) Section 481 of the Companies Act provides for dissolution of the company. The Company Judge in the High Court can order dissolution of a company on the grounds stated therein. The effect of the dissolution is that the company …

CIT vs. Dimension Apparels Ltd (Delhi High Court) Read More »