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DATE: May 14, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 15, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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CITATION:
Rule 34(5) of the ITAT Rules provides that “ordinarily” the order on an appeal should be pronounced within no more than 90 days from the date of concluding the hearing. A pedantic view of the rule cannot be taken. The period of 90 days should be computed by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown due to Covid-19 was in force. We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the pronouncement of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is a pragmatic tool of the social order. The tenets of law being enacted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is required to interpreted

In the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view that rather than taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring pronouncement of orders within 90 days, disregarding the important fact that the entire country was in lockdown, we should compute the period of 90 days by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown was in force. We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the pronouncement of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is a pragmatic tool of the social order. The tenets of law being enacted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is required to interpreted. The interpretation so assigned by us is not only in consonance with the letter and spirit of rule 34(5) but is also a pragmatic approach at a time when a disaster, notified under the Disaster Management Act 2005, is causing unprecedented disruption in the functioning of our justice delivery system.

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DATE: January 30, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 5, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 254(1): This manner of disposing appeals by the Tribunal is not expected of it and cannot stand to the scrutiny of law and justice. The Tribunal cannot refer to decisions on its own without giving the litigant an opportunity to distinguish it. This results in a breach of the principles of natural justice. It also cannot omit to deal with the decisions relied upon by the litigant. Not dealing with the cited decisions leads to the order being bad as an order without reasons

The basic grievance of the Appellant is that the impugned order of the Tribunal has been passed in breach of principles of natural justice. This for two reasons, one the decisions relied upon by the Tribunal of its own (not cited at the bar) in the impugned order were not brought to the notice of the Appellant at any time, before the passing of the impugned order. This resulted in order adverse to the Appellant without the Appellant having an opportunity to address the Tribunal on the inapplicability of the decisions to the facts of this case. Thus, in effect an order without hearing

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DATE: August 27, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 7, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 254(1): The Tribunal should not make general observations that there are "contrary decisions". This statement led us to direct counsel to examine the law and bring to our attention any decision contrary to the view taken by the Supreme Court in Mahalaxmi Sugar Mills 123 ITR 429 etc. We are now informed by Counsel that there are no contrary decisions. All this effort and time would have been saved if the Tribunal had made specific reference to contrary decisions or not stated so in the absence of referring to the citations. We request the Tribunal to be specific about the decisions and make a mention of the citation in the order and not make general observations

All this effort and time would have been saved if the Tribunal had made specific reference to contrary decisions or not stated so in the absence of referring to the citations. Therefore, we would request the Tribunal to be specific about the decisions and make a mention of the citation in the order and not make general observations as in this case.

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DATE: August 29, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 7, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09, 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 144C/ 254: (i) Condonation of delay of 1018 days: None should be deprived of an adjudication on merits unless it is found that the litigant deliberately delayed the filing of appeal. Delay due to improper legal advice should be condoned. A technical view of dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay should not be taken if the legal issue has to be decided for other years (ii) A draft assessment order u/s 144C issued with a notice of demand u/s 156 and a s/ 271(1)(c) penalty notice is null and void (Eaton Fluid Power 96 TM.com 512 followed, BS Ltd 94 TM.com 346 (Hyd) distinguished)

It is relevant to note the judgment of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Vijay Vishin Meghani Vs. DCIT & Anr (2017) 398 ITR 250 (Bom) holding that none should be deprived of an adjudication on merits unless it is found that the litigant deliberately delayed the filing of appeal. Similar to the cases under consideration, in that case too, delay of 2984 days crept in due to improper legal advice. Relying on Concord of India Ins. Co. Limited VS Nirmala Devi (1979) 118 ITR 507 (SC), the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court condoned the delay. In yet another case in Anil Kumar Nehru and Another vs. ACIT (2017) 98 CCH 0469 BomHC, there was a delay of 1662 days in filing the appeal. Such a delay was not condoned by the Hon’ble High Court. In further appeal, condoning the delay, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Nehru vs. ACIT (2018) 103 CCH 0231 ISCC, held that : `It is a matter of record that on the identical issue raised by the appellant in respect of earlier assessment, the appeal is pending before the High Court. In these circumstances, the High Court should not have taken such a technical view of dismissing the appeal in the instant case on the ground of delay, when it has to decide the question of law between the parties in any case in respect of earlier assessment year.

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DATE: April 23, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 254(1)/(2): The fact that the judges indicate a decision during the hearing or even dictate a judgement in open court gives no right to the litigant. Judges can change or alter their decision at any time until the judgement is signed & sealed. A MA on the ground that the ITAT Members stated a particular decision during the hearing but did the opposite in the order is not maintainable

The question arises as to whether the Bench while hearing the appeal has given any decision. May be the assessee got the impression in good faith. Even if the impression went to the assessee then also the same does not have any effect on the order of the Court as it is well settled law that a judge can recall the order and change his mind in extreme case where the though draft copy signed and dictated in the open, as held in the case of Kaushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit & Ors. vs. State of Gujrat, [SLP (Criminal) 453/2014)], by the Apex Court

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DATE: December 26, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 29, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08, 2008-09
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CITATION:
Guidelines specified to ensure expeditious hearing of cases referred to Special Benches and Third Members: Inordinate delay in fixation of hearing of Special Bench & Third Member cases is inappropriate and contrary to the scheme of the Act. It also reduces the efficacy and utility of the mechanism to deal with important matters

We share the anguish of the learned counsel. The sequence of events, as set out above, does clearly shows inordinate delay in the special bench case being taken up. It appears that despite specific requisition by the learned Judicial Member and for the reasons best known to the persons concerned, the Registry has not taken care to do the necessary follow up and ensure that the matter is listed for hearing expeditiously, so as to ensure timely disposal of appeals referred to the special benches. The importance of timely disposal of special bench cases and Third Member cases can hardly be over-emphasised. These cases deserve to be taken up on top priority basis. We are of the view that such an inordinate delay in fixation of hearing of special benches cases, particularly when stay is granted, is not only inappropriate and contrary to the scheme of the Act, but it does reduce the efficacy and utility of the mechanism of special benches to deal with important matters on which there is divergence of views by the division benches or which are otherwise of wider ramifications and national importance. Similarly, inordinate delays in disposal of Third Member cases, by itself, makes the expression of dissenting opinion less effective and useful. We, therefore, deem it fit and proper to formulate the following guidelines with a view to ensure the expeditious hearing of cases referred to Special Benches and Third Members

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DATE: November 26, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04, 2004-05
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CITATION:
S. 254(1): The ITAT should give independent reasons showing consideration of the submissions made on behalf of the assessee. An appellate order which affirms the order of the lower authority need not be a very detailed order. Nevertheless, there should be some indication in the order passed by the appellate authority of due application of mind to the contentions raised by the asseseee in the context of findings of the lower authority which were the subject matter of the challenge before it

We find that while discussing various issues, the Tribunal has not given any independent reasons showing consideration of the submissions made on behalf of the assessee. We are conscious of the fact that an appellate order which affirms the order of the lower authority need not be a very detailed order, nevertheless, there should be some indication in the order passed by the appellate authority, of due application of mind to the contentions raised by the asseseee in the context of findings of the lower authority which were the subject matter of the challenge before it. In view of above, the interest of justice would be served if the impugned order is quashed and set aside and the appeals are restored to the Tribunal for fresh consideration

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DATE: November 1, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 30, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 254(1)/ Rule 34(5)(c): An order passed by the Tribunal even one day after the prescribed period of 90 days from the date of hearing causes prejudice to the assessee and is liable to be recalled and the appeal posted for fresh hearing

Since, in the present case, the order has been pronounced one day beyond 90 days prescribed under the Rules, we respectfully following the order of the Hon’ble High Court discussed above, recall the order dated 09.11.2017 without going into the merits of the other grounds raised in the application, for fresh hearing

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DATE: January 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 254(1)/ Rule 34(5)(c): The Tribunal is mandated to pass orders within 90 days of the hearing. Delay is not justified on the ground that 'administrative clearance' was obtained. The aggrieved party is entitled to seek recall of such an order

The order of the Tribunal while rejecting the rectification application does not dispute the fact that the order dated 3rd February, 2016 passed under Section 254(1) of the Act was passed beyond the period of 90 days from the date of conclusion of its hearing on 22nd September, 2015. However, it records that administrative clearance had been taken to pass such an order beyond the period of 90 days. We are at a loss to understand what is meant by ‘administrative clearance’ and the basis for the same. Besides when, how and from whom the administrative clearance was received, are all questions still at large

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DATE: January 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): Facts recorded by the ITAT have to be accepted as correct and conclusive and cannot be contradicted by affidavit or otherwise. The mere placing of a case law in the paper book does not mean that it was cited before the ITAT and non-consideration thereof is not a mistake apparent from the record. A MA to rectify such alleged mistake of non-consideration of a judgement must be filed as quickly as possible

It is settled position in law that statement of fact recorded in the order of the Court/Tribunal has to be accepted as correct and conclusive. It cannot be contradicted by affidavit or otherwise as held by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas S. Nayak 1982 (2) SCC 463, Central Bank of India vs. Vrajlal K. Gandhi 2003(6) SCC 573 and Jagvir Singh & Others vs. State (Delhi Admn.) 2007 (5) SCC 359. Thus, mere filing of the paperbook is no indication of the fact that the case law referred to in paperbook was relied upon and submissions made on it during course of hearing of the appeal. Moreover, in cases such as this where it is contended by a party that particular case was not considered by the Court/Tribunal/Adjudicating Authority was cited during the course of hearing and is relevant to the issue, then a party would be expected to move the Tribunal as quickly as possible. This for the reason that the issues would be fresh in the mind of the Court/Tribunal/Adjudicating Authority

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