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DATE: January 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 30, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03, 2003-04
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(i)/ 9(1)(vi)/ 9(1)(vii)/ 40(a)(i): Law on whether payment by the assessee to non-resident parties for “call transmission services through dedicated bandwidth” is assessable as income accruing in India, royalty or fees for technical services and whether a disallowance can be made for failure to deduct TDS explained

In the instant case also, the undersea cable for providing dedicated bandwidth to the assessee was installed beyond the territory of India and no operations were carried out by the non-resident party M/s Kick Communication in India. It was responsible for restoring connectivity and Managing faults in connectivity etc in respect of data transmitted through undersea cable only. Similarly, the operations carried out by M/s. IGTL Solutions are also in USA and not in India. Since operations by both the non-resident parties are carried out beyond the territory of India, we thus hold that section 9(1)(i) is of the Act is not attracted in case of above two non-resident parties

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DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 27, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi) 'Royalty' on transfer of software rights: There is a difference between sale of a 'copyrighted article' and the 'copyright' itself. S. 9(1)(vi) applies only to the latter and not the former. Explanation 4 inserted by FA 2012 w.r.e.f. 01.06.1976 has to be read and understood only in that context and cannot be expanded to bring within its fold transactions beyond the realm of the provision

The provisions of section 9(1)(vi) as a whole, would stand attracted in the case of the latter and not the former. Explanations 4 and 7 relied by the authorities would thus have to be read and understood only in that context and cannot be expanded to bring within its fold transaction beyond the realm of the provision. The Tribunal has relied on the decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax V. M.Tech India Pvt Ltd, which supports our view as above. It is brought to our notice that the decision of the Delhi High Court has not been accepted by the Department and an SLP is pending. Be that as it may, in view of the facts and circumstances as observed above, we have no hesitation in dismissing the Departmental Appeal answering the questions of law in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue

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DATE: January 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 16, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi)/ 9(1)(vii): Important law explained on whether payment for use of equipment can be assessed as "royalty" and whether payment for rendering of services can be assessed as "fees for technical services" in the context of s. 9(1)(vi) and 9(1)(vii) and Article 12 of the India-Canada DTAA

Article 12(4) provides that, “The term “fees for technical included services” as used in this Article means payments of any kind to any person in consideration for services of a managerial, technical or consultancy nature (including the provision of such services through technical or other personnel) if such services : (a) are ancillary and subsidiary to the application or enjoyment of the right, property or information for which a payment described in paragraph 3 is received ; or (b) make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes, which enables the person acquiring the services to apply the technology contained therein”. In order to invoke article 12(4)(a) it is necessary that such services should “make available” technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes or consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design The services provided by BT Canada were simply management support or consultancy services which did not involve any transfer of technology. It is not even the case of the Assessing Officer that the services were such that the recipient of service was enabled to perform these services on its own without any further recourse to the service provider. It is in this context that we have to examine the scope of expression ‘make available’

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DATE: January 21, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1998-99, 1999-00
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi)/ Article 12: Law on whether consideration received for licensing of software programmes can be assessed as "royalty" u/s 9(1)(vi) and Article 12 of the DTAA explained

If we analyse and compare various provisions of the Copyright Act with the relevant clauses of the master agreement, it is noted that the said agreement does not permit HLL to carry out any alteration or conversion of any nature, so as to fall within the definition of ‘adaptation’ as defined in Copyright Act, 1957. The right given to the customer for reproduction was only for the limited purpose so as to make it usable for all the offices of HLL in India and no right was given to HLL for commercial exploitation of the same. It is also noted that the terms of the agreement do not allow or authorise HLL to do any of the acts covered by the definition of ‘copyright’. Under these circumstances, the payment made by HLL cannot be construed as payment made towards ‘use’ of copyright particularly when the provisions of Indian Income-tax Act and DTAA are read together with the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957

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DATE: June 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi)/ Article 12: Consideration received for sale of computer software programme in CD Rom is not assessable as “royalty”. The retrospective amendment in Explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) to tax such receipts as royalty has no application to DTAA if the definition of the term “royalty” in the DTAA has remained unchanged

The retrospective amendment brought into statute with effect from 01.06.1976 cannot be read into the DTAA, because the treaty has not been correspondingly amended in line with new enlarged definition of ‘royalty’. The alteration in the provisions of the Act cannot be per se read into the treaty unless there is a corresponding negotiation between the two sovereign nations to amend the specific provision of “royalty” in the same line. The limitation clause cannot be read into the treaty for applying the provisions of domestic law like in Article 7 in some of the treaties, where domestic laws are made applicable. Here in this case, the ‘royalty’ has been specifically defined in the treaty and amendment to the definition of such term under the Act would not have any bearing on the definition of such term in the context of DTAA. A treaty which has entered between the two sovereign nations, then one country cannot unilaterally alter its provision

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DATE: July 11, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 14, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10, 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi): Though in Infrasoft 220 Taxman 273 (Del) the impact of the amendment to s. 9(1)(vi) on the question whether consideration received for sale of pre-packaged software was “royalty” or “fee for technical services” or "business income" was not examined, it is not required to be examined because u/s 90 (3) provides that the Act prevails only if it is more beneficial compared to the DTAA

The short question considered by the Court in Director of Income Tax v. Infrasoft Limited (2014) 220 Taxman 273 (Del) was whether the term “royalty” covered by Article 12 (3) of the DTAA would apply in the context of sale of pre-packaged copyrighted software. The Court stated that it has not examined the effect of the subsequent amendment to Section 9 (1) (vi) of the Act and also whether the amount received for use of software would be royalty in terms thereof for the reason that the Assessee is covered by the DTAA, the provisions of which are more beneficial

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DATE: June 2, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Law on whether "installation or construction activity" constitutes a PE under Article 5 and whether "mobilisation/ demobilisation charges" can be treated as "royalty" u/s 9 (1) (vi) & Article 12 (3) (b) of the DTAA and whether "installation charges" could be treated as "Fees for Technical Services" under Explanation 2 below s. 9 (1) (vii) read with Article 12 (4) (a) of the India-Singapore DTAA explained

Therefore, on two counts the finding of the AAR on FTS cannot be sustained. The first being that the installation services are not incidental to the mobilisation/demobilisation service. The contract was in fact for installation, erection of equipment. Mobilisation/demobilisation constituted an integral part of the contract. Secondly, the AAR has proceeded on a factual misconception that the dominion and control of the equipment was with IOCL. It was erroneously concluded that the payment for such mobilisation/demobilisation constitutes royalty. In that view of the matter, the consideration for installation cannot not be characterized as FTS and brought within the ambit of Article 12.4(a) of the DTAA. The resultant position is that no part of the income earned by the Petitioner from the contract with IOCL can be taxed in India

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DATE: May 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
(i) Purchase of a license to use shelf/shrink-wrapped software is purchase of a “product” and not a “copyright”, (ii) The retrospective insertion of Explanation 4 to s. 9(1)(vi) to include “software” in the definition of “royalty” does not apply to DTAAs, (iii) In view of the conflict of views amongst the High Courts, the view in favour of the assessee should be followed, (iv) An obligation to deduct TDS u/s 195 cannot be imposed by the retrospective insertion of Explanation 4 to s. 9(1)(vi), (v) As payments for software were not “royalty” at the time of payment, the assessee cannot be held to be in default for not deducting TDS

The assessee cannot be said to have paid the consideration for use of or the right to use copyright but has simply purchased the copyrighted work embedded in the CD- ROM which can be said to be sale of “good” by the owner. The consideration paid by the assessee thus as per the clauses of DTAA cannot be said to be royalty and the same will be outside the scope of the definition of “royalty” as provided in DTAA and would be taxable as business income of the recipient. The assessee is entitled to the fair use of the work/product including making copies for temporary purpose for protection against damage or loss even without a license provided by the owner in this respect and the same would not constitute infringement of any copyright of the owner of the work even as per the provisions of section 52 of the Copyright Act,1957

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DATE: March 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 31, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vii)/ 40(a)(ia)/ 194J: “Technical services” & “Managerial and Consultancy service” denotes services that cater to special & exclusive needs of the consumer/user. A "facility", even if termed as a service, which is available to all users, does not come within the ambit of “technical services” in Explanation 2 of s. 9(1)(vii)

“Technical services” like “Managerial and Consultancy service” would denote seeking of services to cater to the special needs of the consumer/user as may be felt necessary and the making of the same available by the service provider. It is the above feature that would distinguish/identify a service provided from a facility offered. While the former is special and exclusive to the seeker of the service, the latter, even if termed as a service, is available to all and would therefore stand out in distinction to the former. The service provided by the Stock Exchange for which transaction charges are paid fails to satisfy the aforesaid test of specialized, exclusive and individual requirement of the user or consumer who may approach the service provider for such assistance/service. It is only service of the above kind that, according to us, should come within the ambit of the expression “technical services” appearing in Explanation 2 of Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. In the absence of the above distinguishing feature, service, though rendered, would be mere in the nature of a facility offered or available which would not be covered by the aforesaid provision of the Act

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DATE: February 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
Entire law on whether consideration for user of software is assessable as "royalty" in the light of the different definitions in s. 9(1)(vi) and Article 12 of the DTAA and the conflicting judgements of various High Courts explained

A comparison of the definition of ‘royalty’ as provided under the DTAA (as reproduced above) with the definition of ‘royalty’ as provided under Income Tax Act shows that the same are not at para materia with each other.The definition provided under the DTAA is the very short and restrictive definition, whereas, the definition of the royalty as provided under the Income Tax Act is a very wide and inclusive but vague. A careful reading of the relevant provision under the DTAA and under the Income Tax Act reveals that the DTAA covers only a part of the items mentioned under sub clause (i) to (v)to Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi). We may mention here that the section9(1)(vi) having sub clauses (a), (b), & (c) is very vast to cover consideration paid for any right, property or information used or services utilized for the purpose of business or profession. Further, we find that in the said sub clauses(a), (b) & (c) of section 9(1) (vi), the wording is somewhat vague and negatively written.

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