Search Results For: Vibhu Bakhru J


Technip Singapore Pte Ltd vs. DIT (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: June 2, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
Law on whether "installation or construction activity" constitutes a PE under Article 5 and whether "mobilisation/ demobilisation charges" can be treated as "royalty" u/s 9 (1) (vi) & Article 12 (3) (b) of the DTAA and whether "installation charges" could be treated as "Fees for Technical Services" under Explanation 2 below s. 9 (1) (vii) read with Article 12 (4) (a) of the India-Singapore DTAA explained

Therefore, on two counts the finding of the AAR on FTS cannot be sustained. The first being that the installation services are not incidental to the mobilisation/demobilisation service. The contract was in fact for installation, erection of equipment. Mobilisation/demobilisation constituted an integral part of the contract. Secondly, the AAR has proceeded on a factual misconception that the dominion and control of the equipment was with IOCL. It was erroneously concluded that the payment for such mobilisation/demobilisation constitutes royalty. In that view of the matter, the consideration for installation cannot not be characterized as FTS and brought within the ambit of Article 12.4(a) of the DTAA. The resultant position is that no part of the income earned by the Petitioner from the contract with IOCL can be taxed in India

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Girish Bansal vs. UOI (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: April 28, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1993-94, 1994-95
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CITATION:
Entire law on concept of "revenue receipt", "capital receipt" and "casual income" explained in the context of taxability of compensation received for cancellation of a sale deed of immovable property. If the AO claims that the receipt is a capital gain, he cannot change his stand to contend that it is a revenue receipt

The sum of Rs.20 lakhs received by the Assessees was in the context of the cancellation of the sale certificate and the sale deed executed in their favour in relation to an immovable property and neither Assessee was dealing in immovable property as part of his business. While it could if at all be said to be in the nature of a capital receipt, what is relevant for the present case is that the Revenue has been unable to make out a case for treating the said receipt as of a casual and non-recurring nature that could be brought to tax under Section 10(3) read with Section 56 of the Act. Following the decision in Cadell Weaving Mill (supra), there can be no manner of doubt that what is in the nature of capital receipt, cannot be sought to be brought to tax by resorting to Section 10(3) read with Section 56 of the Act

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Indu Lata Rangwala vs. DCIT (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: May 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1999-2000
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CITATION:
S. 143(1)/ 147: Entire law on the reopening of s. 143(1) assessments in the light of Zuari Estate Development 373 ITR 661 (SC) explained

Whereas in a case where the initial assessment order is under Section 143 (3), and it is sought to be reopened within four years from the expiry of the relevant assessment year, the AO has to base his ‘reasons to believe’ that income has escaped assessment on some fresh tangible material that provides the nexus or link to the formation of such belief. In a case where the initial return is processed under Section 143 (1) of the Act and intimation is sent to the Assessee, the reopening of such assessment no doubt requires the AO to form reasons to believe that income has escaped assessment, but such reasons do not require any fresh tangible material

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Adobe Systems Inc vs. ADIT (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: May 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07
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CITATION:
Entire law on what constitutes a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India in terms of Article 5(1), 5(2)(l) or Article 5(5) of the Indo-USA DTAA explained. If the alleged PE has been assessed on ALP basis in terms of Article 7, no income has escaped escapement so as to justify issue of s. 148 notice

Even if the subsidiary of a foreign company is considered as its PE, only such income as is attributable in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 7 can be brought to tax. In the present case, there is no dispute that Adobe India – which according to the AO is the Assessee’s PE – has been independently taxed on income from R&D services and such tax has been computed on the basis that its dealings with the Assessee are at arm’s length (that is, at ALP). Therefore, even if Adobe India is considered to be the Assessee’s PE, the entire income which could be brought in the net of tax in the hands of the Assessee has already been so taxed in the hands of Adobe India. There is no material that would even remotely suggest that the Assessee has undertaken any activity in India other than services which have already been subjected to ALP scrutiny/adjustment in the hands of Adobe India

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Tata Teleservices Limited vs. CBDT (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: May 11, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 143(1D): Instruction No.1 of 2015 dated 13.01.2015 which curtails the discretion of the AO by 'preventing' him from processing the return and granting refund, where notice has been issued to the assessee u/s 143(2), is unsustainable in law and quashed

The real effect of the instruction is to curtail the discretion of the AO by ‘preventing’ him from processing the return, where notice has been issued to the Assessee under Section 143(2) of the Act. If the legislative intent was that the return would not be processed at all once a notice is issued under Section 143 (2) of the Act, then the legislature ought to have used express language and not the expression “shall not be necessary”. By the device of issuing an instruction in purported exercise of its power under Section 119 of the Act, the CBDT cannot proceed to interpret or instruct the income tax department to “prevent” the issue of refund. In the event that a notice is issued to the Assessee under Section 143 (2) of the Act, it will be a matter the discretion of the concerned AO whether he should process the return

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Pr. CIT vs. Fortune Technocomps (P) Ltd (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: May 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c) penalty on Bogus Purchases: If the assessment order in the quantum proceedings is altered by an appellate authority in a significant way, the very basis of initiation of the penalty proceedings is rendered non-existent and the AO cannot continue the penalty proceedings on the basis of the same notice

Once the assessment order of the AO in the quantum proceedings was altered by the CIT (A) in a significant way, the very basis of initiation of the penalty proceedings was rendered non-existent. The AO could not have thereafter continued the penalty proceedings on the basis of the same notice. Also, the Court concurs with the CIT (A) and the ITAT that once the finding of the AO on bogus purchases was set aside, it could not be said that there was any concealment of facts or furnishing of inaccurate particulars by the Assessee that warranted the imposition of penalty under Section 271 (1) (c) of the Act

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Hyosung Corporation vs. AAR (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: April 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 17, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 143(2)/ 245R(2): A notice u/s 143(2)(ii) cannot be issued in a routine, casual or mechanical manner but after forming an opinion that it is "necessary or expedient" to do so. A S. 143(2) notice in the standard form is not a bar u/s 245R(2) for admission of an AAR application for advance ruling

Under Section 143 (2) (ii) of the Act, an AO can serve on the Assessee a notice requiring him to attend his office and produce any evidence on which the Assessee seeks to rely in support of return if the AO “considers it necessary or expedient to ensure that the Assessee has not understated the income or has not computed excessive loss or has not underpaid the tax in any manner’. Therefore, the scope of the enquiry that an AO can undertake in terms of Section 143 (2) (ii) is a wide ranging one. What is relevant for the present case is that prior to issuance of the notice under Section 143 (2) (ii) the AO has to form an opinion that it is ‘necessary or expedient’ to ensure that an Assessee has not (i) understated the income or (ii) has not computed excessive loss, or (iii) has not underpaid the tax in any manner. The AO is, therefore, not expected to issue a notice under Section 143 (2) (ii) in a routine or casual or mechanical manner

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

CIT vs. Herbalife International India Pvt. Ltd (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: May 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 16, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(i): The law in s. 40(a)(i) that failure to deduct TDS on payment to a non-resident will result in a disallowance violates the non-discrimination clause in Article 26 of the India-USA DTAA because a similar disallowance is not made on payments to residents (pre s. 40(a)(ia))

The argument of the Revenue overlooks the fact that the condition under which deductibility is disallowed in respect of payments to non-residents, is plainly different from that when made to a resident. Under Section 40 (a) (i), as it then stood, the allowability of the deduction of the payment to a non-resident mandatorily required deduction of TDS at the time of payment. On the other hand, payments to residents were neither subject to the condition of deduction of TDS nor, naturally, to the further consequence of disallowance of the payment as deduction. The expression “under the same conditions” in Article 26 (3) of the DTAA clarifies the nature of the receipt and conditions of its deductibility. It is relatable not merely to the compliance requirement of deduction of TDS. The lack of parity in the allowing of the payment as deduction is what brings about the discrimination

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

CIT vs. Indu Surveyors & Loss Assessors Pvt. Ltd (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: October 15, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 6, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 153A/ 153C: If the assessee stands amalgamated with another Co, it ceases to exists and all proceedings of search u/s 132, notice and assessment u/s 153C on the assessee are a nullity and void ab initio

In identical circumstances, in cases arising out of the same search, this Court has invalidated the assessment proceedings against the Assessee in those cases which, on account of having merged with another entity with effect from a date anterior to the search, also no longer existed on the date of search, on the date of the issue of notice and consequent assessment order passed under Section 153 C of the Act.

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Nortel Networks India International Inc vs. DIT (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: May 4, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 5, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06
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CITATION:
Important principles laid down whether profits arising from off-shore supply of goods can be taxed in India on basis that (a) the goods continued in the possession of seller till acceptance of the goods by buyer in India, (b) the seller had a liaison office in India, (c) the seller had a wholly-owned subsidiary in India which negotiated contacts with the buyer, (d) installation, commissioning etc services were provided in India etc

The controversy whether the Assessee has a PE in India is interlinked to the finding that Nortel India had discharged some of the obligations of the Assessee under the Equipment Contract. Whilst, the Income Tax Authorities have held that the contracts entered into with Reliance – the Equipment Contact, Software Contract and Services Contract – are essentially a part of the singular turnkey contract, the Assessee contends to the contrary. Further, the Income Tax Authorities have held that a part of the Equipment Contract assigned to the Assessee was, in fact, performed by Nortel India. This too, is stoutly disputed by the Assessee. The question whether the Assessee has a PE in India is clearly interlinked with the issue whether Nortel India or Nortel LO had performed any of the functions or discharged any of the obligations assumed by the Assessee. Assessee argued that agreement for supply of hardware (Equipment Contract) could have been directly executed between Reliance and the Assessee but owing to relaince’s insistence on an Indian company being responsible for the entire works, agreements were executed between Nortel India and Reliance, with Nortel Canada as a surety.

Posted in All Judgements, High Court